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Abstract 
The paper analyses the issues surrounding the planned implementation of the Gulf 
Dinar among the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – the 
United Arab Emirates, the State of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the 
Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar and the state of Kuwait. The paper will 
begin with laying down the foundation of attempting to draw any similarities and 
differences in terms of each country’s economic fundamentals. It will then assess 
the grand idea for a monetary union by looking at the pros and cons, intra-
regional trade, labour and capital movement and the political will of all six GCC 
countries. Updated issues that may have hampered the introduction of the Gulf 
Dinar will then be analysed by looking at the economic convergence criteria and 
its implications. Comparison with the European Monetary Union will be made 
throughout the paper, where necessary. The paper ends will then come out with a 
number of suggestions that may improve the implementation of the Gulf Dinar. 
Lastly, the paper will discuss the political implications of the implementation of 
the Gulf Dinar as the sole currency for the Gulf countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The creation of a monetary union for the GCC member countries had actually been 
mooted as early as 1975 when four of the GCC members attempted to reach a monetary 
coordination towards realising a single monetary union. However, the attempt proved 
unsuccessful and later put to rest (Alreshan, 2010)1. The drive to have a single currency 
within the region was put back to life when the GCC’s Unified Economic Agreement (UEA) 
was ratified in 19822; a year after the GCC was formed. However, it was only in 2000 that the 
Supreme Council of the GCC mandated the Committee of Monetary Agencies and Central 
Bank Governors and the Financial and Economic Cooperation Committee to draw up a 
                                                          
1
 It was between 1975 and 1978 that the four member countries i.e. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates attempted to form a monetary union. 
2
 Article 22 of the UEA states that “The member states shall seek to coordinate their financial, monetary, and 
banking policies and enhance cooperation between monetary agencies and central banks, including an endeavor 
to establish a common currency in order to further their desired economic integration”. 
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working plan and a timetable to establish a single currency. This resulted in the establishment 
of high level technical working group to study the requirements of a monetary union. Initial 
results were then presented at the GCC Supreme Council meeting in Muscat in December 
2001. It is at the Muscat summit that the Heads of States agreed on the following (Siegfrid, 
2005): 
• By the end of 2002, all national currencies of GCC countries shall be pegged to the US 
dollar. 
• By end of 2005, Financial and Economic Cooperation Committee and the Committee of 
Monetary Agencies and Central Bank Governors shall agree on economic convergence 
criteria and other technical matters with the aim to introduce a single currency 
simultaneously. 
• Between 2005 and 2010, the GCC members shall strive to fulfil the criteria. 
• In January 2010, a single currency shall be introduced. 
However, the goal towards monetary unification hit a snag when Oman announced in 
2006 that it would not be able to meet the target date and proposed that other GCC members 
to move ahead with the monetary union; with Oman’s intention to join at a later date. Later in 
May 2007, Kuwait decided to abandon their US dollar peg in their attempt to reduce 
inflationary pressure at the time. Kuwait’s decision to abandon the US dollar and move to peg 
the Kuwait dinar to a basket of international currencies was seen as a blow to one of the 
declarations made at the Muscat summit; i.e. “all national currencies of GCC countries shall 
be pegged to the US dollar”. In November 2007, the UAE central bank announced that the 
UAE would consider switching from a US dollar peg to a currency basket if the US dollar 
continues to weaken. (Buiter, 2007). The UAE then pulled out of the project in May 2009 in 
protest to the proposed site of the new joint central bank in Saudi Arabia. On 16 March 2010, 
Reuters reported that Oman’s central bank Executive President Hamood Sangour al-Zadjali 
as saying that Oman is not reconsidering joining the Gulf monetary union. 
Obviously it has not been smooth sailing for the Khaleeji, and it came as no surprise 
that when 2010 came, the Muscat declarations seemed far from being a reality. In fact, 
Mohamed al-Mazrooei, GCC Assistant Secretary General for Economic Affairs told Reuters 
that “I personally expect the single currency to be launched in 2015, if we step up the efforts 
and the work of various committees”.3 With the pullout of Oman and UAE, it is now in the 
hands of the other four GCC members to push through with their agenda. The proponents of a 
GCC monetary union may be feeling a little bit too optimistic for the prospect of its own 
monetary union by looking at the success story of the European monetary union (EMU), but 
one has to remember that the European Union (EU) was founded more than 50 years ago 
before the Euro currency came into existence. (Buiter, 2007)   
This paper analyses the issues surrounding the planned implementation of the Gulf 
dinar among the GCC members. Assessment on the plan for the Gulf dinar, its state of 
readiness, as well as issues surrounding its delay in introducing the dinar will be covered in 
this paper. Comparisons to the EMU experience will also be made especially in the area of 
economic convergence. Suggestions will also be included in the paper with respect to the 
                                                          
3
 Reuters, 2010 
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currency peg of the Gulf dinar. Lastly, the political implications under fiat money system and 
under real commodity peg will be included in the paper as well. 
 
2. Overview on the GCC member countries 
 
This section reviews the main features of the six GCC countries’ economies that may 
impact the planned monetary union. They are among others, discussions on the state of 
economy of the GCC as a unit vis-a-vis the global economy, economic openness of these 
economies, similarities and differences between the GCC economies, level of intra-trade 
activities between the GCC economies, oil and gas dependence and the level of financial 
markets sophistication between the six GCC countries. 
2.1. GCC in the global economy 
 
As of 2009, the GCC as a whole has a population of 41 million and an average GDP 
(Nominal) per capita of USD35,496 (CIA). In terms of the number of inhabitants, the GCC 
pales in comparison to the world’s 6.8 billion population. However, in terms of GDP per 
capita, the combined average of the GCC GDP per capita is more than 3 times the world’s 
GDP per capita of USD10,500. Even the Euro zone’s GDP per capita in 2009 is lower than 
the GCC at USD32,700. In terms of the combined GDP in the GCC, it has increased 
tremendously from USD11 billion in 1971 to USD821 billion in 2007 (Alreshan, 2010). 
Recent growth for the GCC has also been rather commendable amidst the bleak global 
economic landscape last year., the GCC recorded a decent economic growth of an average 
1.6 percent compared to the global economic contraction of 1 percent and the Euro zone 
growth of -4 percent last year4. See Table 1 for selected key economic data for the Gulf 
States.  
 
Table 1: Selected key economic data for the GCC member countries 
 2006 GDP1 
(USD billion) 
2009 
Population2  
2009 GDP 
(Nominal) per 
capita (USD)3 
2009 GDP 
(real) growth 
rate2 
UAE 168 4,789,395 46,584 -4 
Bahrain 178 728,709 24,355 2.9 
Saudi Arabia 450 28,686,633 14,871 -0.6 
Oman 36 3,418,085 18,718 2.6 
Qatar 42 833,285 75,956 9.2 
Kuwait 90 2,692,526 32,491 -0.7 
Sources: 1(Buiter, 2007), 2(CIA), 3(International Monetary Fund, 2010) 
                                                          
4
 According to CIA Factbook 2009 statistics 
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2.1.1. Oil and gas 
 
Statistics show that as at the end of 2008, the Middle East has about 60 percent of the 
world’s oil reserves; and GCC collectively accounts for about 40 percent of the world’s 
proved oil reserves. So naturally the Middle East controls the lion share of the world’s oil 
production at 31.9 percent and within the Middle East, GCC produces 22.6 percent of total 
global oil production as at end of 2008 (BP), as shown in Charts 1 and 2. Therefore, since oil 
and gas plays an extremely important role in the GCC5, member countries have consciously 
taken steps to diversify their economies as they look at other sectors of the economy such as 
tourism, manufacturing and banking. Among the factors6 that made policy makers in the 
GCC realised for the need to push for economic diversification are: 
• The fact that oil resources will not last forever and the never-ending search for 
alternative energy will put pressure to carbon energy. 
• Realisation that oil will not be able to continue to boost economic growth at the same 
pace it did in the 1970s and the start of 1980s within the GCC region. 
 
Chart 1: Proven Oil Reserves as at end 2008 
 
Source: BP Statistical Reviewof World Energy June 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Oil and gas contributes more than one third of GDP in the GCC. See (Siegfrid, Regional Monetary Integration 
in the Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council, 2005). 
6
 See (Alreshan, GCC monetary union, 2010) 
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Chart 2: Proven Gas Reserves as at end 2008 
 
Source: BP Statistical Reviewof World Energy June 2009 
2.1.2. Wealth 
 
Without doubt, much of the Gulf’s wealth is due to its exploits of rich natural 
resources in oil and gas. Since the GCC has relatively smaller population with the lion’s share 
of the global oil and gas reserves, it makes the GCC has the highest energy reserves on a per 
capita basis. Where per capita oil reserves are more than five times higher than in Venezuela, 
over 30 times higher than in Russia, and over 150 times over than the United States (Siegfrid, 
2005). As such, due to GCC’s dependence on oil and gas, their combined wealth is highly 
correlated with oil price as well. Chart 3 shows the level of dependence of each GCC country 
on oil revenues in terms of percentage over total revenue. 
 
Table 2: GCC oil revenue to total revenues (percentage) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Bahrain 73.0 72.6 75.7 77.1 80.1 
Kuwait 88.7 91.2 94.4 93.6 93.1 
Oman 70.1 71.9 70.1 64.8 62.1 
Qatar 64.1 66.0 67.1 64.6 60.7 
Saudi Arabia 78.8 84.1 89.4 89.7 87.5 
UAE 73.7 77.4 69.4 81.9 77.1 
Source: Gulf national central banks 
2.1.3. Trade 
 
As far as international trade is concerned, the GCC economy as a whole is a rather 
open economy with certain countries like UAE and Bahrain registering trade surpluses 
between 2003 and 2007. See Table 3 for degree of economic openness for each individual 
GCC country. This degree of openness is valued by the percentage of import and export 
values over the country’s GDP. 
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Table 3: Degree of openness in GCC countries (percentage) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Bahrain 128.5 133.0 145.9 150.7 136.2 
Kuwait 66.1 69.4 75.1 70.5 76.6 
Oman 85.5 89.4 89.5 91.3 101 
Qatar 76.9 77.1 83.4 88.9 90.1 
Saudi Arabia 62.9 69.3 76.1 78.8 84.3 
UAE 134.0 152.0 145.2 149.7 164.3 
Source: Gulf national central banks 
 
As we can see from Table 2, easily more than half of the revenues for each GCC 
members are from oil and gas; as such we can deduce that the GCC exports mainly oil and 
gas to register the trade surplus. In fact, over 65 percent of total GCC exports are oil and gas 
products. Meanwhile, the GCC imports a high proportion of consumer and capital goods as a 
result of the scorched climate condition and the low share of manufacturing. In terms of 
trading partners, Asia especially Japan, South Korea, Singapore and China are top export 
destination with more than half of GCC exports goes to Asia; followed by the EU and the US 
at 11 and 12 percent, respectively (Siegfrid, 2005). 
2.2. Similarities and differences between GCC countries 
 
The six GCC countries share the same Arabic language, religion, geographic location 
and topography, and to certain extent culture and history. The GCC also shares similar 
economic structure that is blessed with an abundance of oil and gas reserves, which translates 
into trading nations that depends heavily on oil and gas (even though at varying degrees 
between the 6 countries). As the GCC are rather heavily dependent on oil and gas as exports, 
they also share the same structural economic problems; hence creating the similar need for 
economic diversification. Human capital seemed to be a similar problem within the GCC 
where their private sector depends rather heavily on foreign expatriates, who are less costly 
than employing nationals. It is estimated that the number of foreign workers in the Gulf to be 
in the region of 13.9 million in 2007 (Alreshan, 2010). As the GCC pushes for more 
diversification in its economy from oil and gas, it is conceived that the level of sophistication 
of its financial market is rather low. It was only in recent times that countries like Bahrain 
and UAE (Dubai) put in commendable and serious efforts to be at the forefront of Islamic 
banking. 
There are of course some differences between the economies of the GCC that may 
impact the monetary union. One of them is size and population, Saudi Arabia is by far the 
largest with population size of 28 million and accounting for more than half of total GCC 
GDP. The other five countries are considerably smaller in terms of population and output. 
Another difference is the level of oil and gas reserves between the GCC members. More 
importantly, the projected depletion of reserves varies between these countries. Bahrain and 
Oman top the list as both are projected to fully deplete their oil reserves the fastest by 2011 
and 2022, respectively and gas reserves by 2012 and 2060, respectively. (Siegfrid, 2005). 
These differences brought about another differing factor between the GCC members that the 
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economic diversification efforts are at varying degrees. As such, we can see a more advanced 
financial market in Bahrain and more intense tourism promotion by Oman. 
 
2.2.1. Oil and gas endowment by country 
 
Compared to the other GCC members, Saudi Arabia leads the charts in having the 
most oil reserves. In fact, from Chart 1 we can see that Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves constitute 
more than half of the GCC oil reserves. If we look at oil reserves per capita, Oman and 
Bahrain have the lowest. But more importantly, at current production levels, oil will be 
depleted soonest in Oman and Bahrain, during the next two decades. Meanwhile Qatar tops 
the charts of having the most gas reserves at about 18 percent of world reserves with its 
projected reserves to last until the next 800 years, at current production level. Bahrain again 
faces severe depletion issues as its gas reserves will run out within an estimated less than ten 
years. Even though the GCC as a whole rely heavily on oil and gas, if we look individually, 
the amount of reserves and projected depletion of its oil and gas reserves differ between the 
GCC members. As such, GCC governments have started to diversify their economies into 
banking, tourism, and manufacturing – but at varying levels of intensity. 
2.2.2. Trade patterns of GCC member countries 
 
Since the GCC members produce largely the same competing products rather than 
complementary ones, they tend to look elsewhere than the GCC itself as export destinations. 
This scenario resulted in rather low intra trade activities between the six GCC members. It 
was suggested that since intra-trade is low between the GCC, it would then be good 
motivation for the GCC to push through the successful introduction of the Khaleeji as the 
monetary union would then be able to promote more intra-trade activities. See Table 4 for 
intra-trade ratios among GCC members.  
Table 4: Intra-trade ratios among GCC members 
 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
UAE Average 
2003 15.4 4.8 17.3 7.5 4.8 5.5 9.2 
2004 16.6 4.6 16.3 8.4 4.9 4.4 9.2 
2005 18.5 4.4 16.4 10.0 4.6 4.5 9.7 
2006 18.6 4.6 15.2 10.0 4.8 4.7 9.7 
2007 19.2 4.7 15.0 8.6 5.1 4.7 9.6 
Source: Directions of trade statistics, IMF 
 
As far as economic openness is concerned, the GCC as a whole is a rather open 
economy with average trade surplus of 20 percent of GDP over the last five years (Siegfrid, 
2005). See Table 3 for degree of economic openness in individual GCC countries. As pointed 
out earlier, GCC exports mainly oil and gas and imports high degree of consumer and capital 
goods. The gulf states imports about one third from the Euro zone and over one third from 
Asia, while only 9 percent from the US.  
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2.2.3. Financial markets 
 
The level of sophistication of the financial market within the GCC varies largely due 
to the diversification efforts by each member. As explained earlier, the different levels of 
intensity in diversifying each member’s economy partly due to the level of oil and gas 
reserves and projected depletion of the oil and gas reserves. As such, it came as no surprise 
when Bahrain, which will use all its oil and gas reserves the earliest, is seen to serve as the 
regional banking hub. In fact Bahrain has been positioning itself as an Islamic banking centre 
– competing head on with Malaysia. Bahrain’s banking assets exceed 800 percent of GDP, 
well surpassing GCC average bank asset over GDP of only 122 percent. Saudi Arabia, which 
has the largest oil reserves within the GCC, has only about 62 percent Bank asset over GDP. 
The stock market also saw Bahrain being one of the leaders as total market 
capitalisation (stock market capitalisation to GDP) is 163 percent, only to be topped by 
Kuwait at 171 percent. Unlike the stock market, the bond market is still at its infancy stage. 
Bonds issued by entities within GCC were only recorded at less than 3 percent of GDP. 
(Siegfrid, 2005). 
In the next section, we attempt to analyse the Gulf monetary union in terms of costs 
and benefits for the GCC member countries and the GMU as a whole. 
3. Assessment of the Gulf Monetary Union  
3.1. General costs and benefits of a gulf monetary union 
Using a single currency in GGC countries will bring in many advantages beside 
reducing such unnecessary cost involved in using different currency. Mundell (1961) stated 
that adopting a single currency enables countries to eliminate transaction costs and 
uncertainties of exchange rate movements in the market and helps predict future exchange 
rates. Most of these costs are associated with exchange rate transaction of bid-ask spreads. A 
single currency will provide a significant result to small open economies to trade among each 
others and reduce barriers between them. Cost saving could result in more output and more 
Varity of products and gains customers satisfaction and needs. 
According to Alkholifey (2010), the foreign exchange rate risk could be eliminated by 
adopting a single currency in majority countries, which is considered a major obstacle to 
trade between different markets. Additionally, the common currency will contribute 
effectively to the development and integration of financial markets, especially the bond 
market and the stock market. Furthermore, this pure integration would result in a positive 
effect at the level of monetary and fiscal policies that will infuse transparency and financial 
discipline at the regional level, which is a necessary condition for financial stability in the 
region.  
Kenen (1996) argued further that trade in goods and services especially among small 
firms will be enhanced, this would lead to intensify competition among the firm operating in 
producing same products and increase allocative efficiency. Rose (2000) found out a large 
positive relationship in his research regarding the countries using common currency among 
them in export and import activities, which could help them reduce their exchange risk 
sometimes to zero, beside fixed exchange rate regime. In this system, transparent pricing 
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would be favourable to many small firms to operate without no peruse of large firms 
competitors.  When adopting a GGC common currency as stated by Frankel (1999), monetary 
policy makers would gain more credible and strong exchange rate commitment, furthermore, 
monetary union arrangements are less subject to attacks by speculative practices. 
Benbouziane, Benhabib & Benamar (2009) mentioned that as well, common currency has all 
advantages of being a major attribution to all money function in general such as being an 
acceptable medium of exchange, unit of account and store of value. Furthermore, eliminate a 
capital flows between the partner countries and discourage speculative attacks. There will be 
no more need to save some international reserves for transaction within the zone.  
On the other hand the costs of adopting a single currency, are mainly relinquishing 
monetary autonomy. There will be less autonomy control by monetary and exchange policy 
over members countries. These costs are more likely to be disapprobatory to these dissimilar 
shocks to member GGC economies. In other word, costs tend to lower the flexibility of factor 
markets, as this implies a difficulty of adjustment to shocks. Benbouziane, Benhabib & 
Benamar (2009) argue that fiscal policy is fully effective under fixed exchange rate regime 
and not true policy implementing in GGC countries due to their isolation economy. There is 
possibility of increasing unemployment rate within the countries, when adopting such 
common currency. This is due to the assumption of low inflation and external surplus, which 
could stabilize the economic condition in one hand and cause a problem on the other hand for 
long- run.  With the monetary union there would be no need for action by central bank or 
monetary policy maker to interfere in the policy or take unilaterally initiative to altering 
exchange rate in single currency or changing the interest rate.  
3.2. Business cycle synchronization 
 
The synchronization of member countries business cycles is probably one of the most 
evocative concerns in adopting single currency in GCC. According to AlKholifey (2010), 
countries with highly correlated business cycles tend to have a higher propensity to join in a 
monetary union for their response to shocks which tend to be symmetric too. Joining a 
monetary union could help a country which most likely to be affected by shocks, to soften it 
for instance. Since majority GCC countries are the main producers of Oil and gas in the 
region, which is highly exposed to the shocks. The similarity functions of GGC economies 
and nature of their geography which sum them into the same conclusion and results. 
3.3. Intra-regional trade 
 
With intra-trade agreement, GCC countries will have more advantage in diversifying 
their operation risk and generate high revenues by developing more industrial sectors and 
produce under cost management due to the use of same currency. The implementation of 
common currency would encourage the trade among the GCC countries to produce 
competitive products with high quality.  
Operating cost in GCC countries which used single currency would be low compared 
to other countries which operate under pressure of high cost. Monetary union gains 
economies of scale when the border barriers are eliminated and whole region becomes one 
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market. As result of more competition between suppliers whom compete among themselves 
resulting in a high benefits to consumers. In addition, there would be more flexibility toward 
price set by the suppliers in the market.  
The main factors influencing implementation of common currency in GCC countries 
is the benefits that could be generated from transaction costs reduction due to one economy. 
Economies of GCC countries are similar in nature, and would be a common advantage to 
trade more effectively when adopting single currency. The citizens of GCC countries would 
enjoy more luxury and friendly atmosphere and would be able to strengthen their economies 
compared to outside countries.  
 
3.4. Stable exchange rates 
 
   Majority of GCC countries have pegged their currency to US Dollar to eliminate 
exchange risk and have more flexibility in foreign market. GCC countries have to keep some 
reserve amount of US dollar for their transaction settlement in US Dollar. As result of the 
pegging, GCC currencies were demonstrated by a history of synchronization of exchange rate 
movement against US Dollar and stable cross exchange rate  
Adopting a single currency could totally eliminate a risk involved in exchange rate of 
currency. It seems that a single currency could promote a better trade efficiency between the 
GCC member countries. Therefore, GCC countries will have over control of maintaining 
credibility of their fixed exchange rate arrangement by avoiding the devaluation option even in 
periods of very real depressed oil prices. 
3.5. Labour and capital movement 
 
One of GCC countries call for freedom to work in any GCC country without 
restriction or discrimination. This will provide an easy movement of capital and labour 
among the countries, beside same languages and cultural advantage which allowed a 
flexibility movement of labour easily as compared to the European monetary union for 
instance where there are many different spoken languages. On the other hand, AlKholifey & 
Alreshan (2010) argued that most of labours in GCC countries are foreign expatriates, who 
are claimed less salary and cost. Furthermore, he estimated that the number of foreign 
workers in the Gulf at about 13.9 million in 2007.  
Recently, GCC government has spent much capital to educate their citizens to fit the 
needs of market labours; therefore, they could manage to reduce the foreign workers by 
replacing them with citizens. GCC countries can adopt one salary system approach whereby 
all governments should pay similar salaries to workers. This will allow them to have fair 
salary payment to the workers in the GCC countries. The movement of labour would be easy, 
when there is an increase of production in one particular country and call for more labour. 
The size of GCC countries is reflecting actually the demand of consumption of each citizen. 
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3.6. The political will  
 
Overall experience of GCC politics, there were not much conflict among them. This 
shows a strong relationship and support to unite under single currency. When looking at 
European political aspects as stated by Wyplosz (2001) who declared that Europe’s lesson 
number 1 is that what matters is a political will to seek closer economic and financial 
integration, but not tied to any precisely defined plan and schedule. 
GCC could learn more from European political and adopt different methodology to 
avoid political conflicts that may arise from different thoughts and beliefs, but since they 
have the same languages, culture and open economy among them. Therefore, this will reduce 
the barriers. 
In the following section, we will discuss the convergence criteria set by the Gulf 
Monetary Union as well as their implications in contrast with the convergence procedure 
settled by the European Union.  
 
4. The Gulf monetary union convergence criteria as compared to 
the European Monetary union 
 
A monetary union in the classical literature as well as in the contemporary practice is 
a successful and beneficial process, in the sense that it solves many problems and encourages 
the social and economic well being not only within the member countries of the union, but 
also in these countries’ economic partners, as well as the in the developing countries that may 
benefit from the improvement of the economic conditions within the leading countries in 
forms of financial aids for instance. Though, we should recognise that monetary unions 
involve some issues that may arise because of several reasons, one of which is the economic 
convergence and the way it was planned, that is why in the next section, we will highlight the 
criteria of convergence set by the GMU member countries and their implications especially in 
regards to the monetary and fiscal policies, the regional central banking with a unified central 
bank, the exchange rate regime and the foreign exchange reserves requirement as well as the 
issues related to the seigniorage revenue and how it should be allocated among the GMU 
member countries.    
To enrich the analysis and make it more significant, we will try to make a constructive 
comparison with the EMU which was considered a successful experience until now, inspite 
of the recent debt crisis in Greece.   
4.1. Assessment of the convergence criteria  
 
In the context of the EU, the nominal convergence established by the Maastricht 
treaty is based upon four main criteria; the first is the inflation rate which should not exceed 
the lowest inflation rate among the first three members by more than 1.5%. The second 
criterion is regarding the interest rate i.e. the long-term nominal interest rates should not 
exceed the average interest rate of the first three member countries by more than 2%. The 
third criterion emphasises the exchange rate stability whereby the normal fluctuation margins 
expected by the exchange mechanism of the European Monetary System should be 
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maintained for at least two years before the assessment. The fourth and last criterion is in 
regard to the public deficit and debt, whereby the deficit of each and every member country 
should not exceed 3% of the real GDP, and on the other hand the public debt should not 
exceed 60% of the GDP of each member country. However, an exception has been made 
regarding the last criterion i.e. countries with a deficit exceeding 3% of the GDP are allowed 
to join the EU if it is proven that this excess is just temporary and will not continue further. 
The Maastricht treaty refers only to the nominal convergence, however in the case of 
Central and Western Europe countries wishing to join the EU, with different economic and 
political structures, it is necessary to consider the real convergence as well; the latter includes 
the degree of openness of the economy, the weight of the bilateral trade with the EU as a 
portion of the total external trade of the respective country, the economic and political 
structure, the GDP per capita, etc.   
The strongest refutation however against the Maastricht convergence strategy is that it 
may make convergence of countries with weak currencies more difficult to achieve. In 
addition, the criteria are interrelated in some way. A country that fails to undertake a credible 
disinflationary strategy, because of its infamous record of inflation, is more likely to 
experience an increase in its real interest rate, as the decline in the observed inflation is not 
matched by a decline in market expectation of inflation. This in turn will increase the debt 
burden, which might force the authorities to increase taxes in order to meet the debt GDP 
criterion (De Grauwe, 1995). 
As for the Gulf Monetary Union, it has adopted the same convergence criteria stated 
in the Maastricht treaty in for the EU, namely, interest rate, inflation rate, public debt as well 
as the public deficit, taking into account the same convergence benchmarks, in regards to the 
interest rate, public debt and public deficit, however, the GMU opted for 2% as inflation rate 
benchmark instead of 1.5%, furthermore, GMU has opted for the foreign exchange reserve as 
a way to ensure the monetary convergence and stability instead of the exchange rate itself 
used in the case of the EU.   
In the next sections we will discuss every convergence criterion in the context of the 
Gulf Union as compared to the EU.   
4.1.1. Inflation rate 
 
In the context of monetary unions, it is important to take into account the inflation 
rates of the potential future members, in the sense that the increase in the general level of 
prices in a member country implies that the purchasing power in this country’s currency will 
decline, which may subsequently cause price instability within the union. This measure was 
put in place in order to prevent the monetary and price instability.  
The European Monetary Union was not made immediately after the establishment of 
the European Union in 1957. Since 1970, the establishment of the European Economic and 
monetary union was considered, but starting from 1972, there was a huge monetary 
instability, this is why the monetary union has been postponed. 
The European monetary system in 1979 came out with ECU (European Currency 
Unit), which is a virtual money comprising a basket of values, in order to limit the exchange 
rates fluctuations among the member countries’ currencies, prior to the monetary union.  
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The EMS with its ECU solution performed well, but it did not solve the issue of free 
circulation of capital within the European zone, which is why in 1989, Delores report 
recommended the economic and monetary union to be made in three phases, whereby the 
first phase strengthens the monetary cooperation. The second phase emphasizes the 
currencies’ convergence and puts in place respective institutions and regulations, while in the 
third and last phase of course there should be the emergence and appearance of the Euro.  
For the inflation rate requirement as stated above and which should not exceed the 
lowest inflation rate among the first three members by more than 1.5%, it is set as part of the 
second phase. In the early years of the Euro adoption, the member countries’ inflation rates 
were highly volatile, in the case of Portugal for instance, the inflation rate was between 
1.89% and 29.3% from 1980 to 1998. In 1999 when the country adopted the Euro as the sole 
currency, the inflation rate was about 2.1% which matches the EU requirement and from then 
on, it started to be less volatile. In the case of Greece the inflation rate was very high 
amounting to 24.7% in 1980, but the country could control it to reach 3.6% in 2001 when the 
country adopted the Euro, and since then it was maintained approximately at the same level.  
As for the countries that have not adopted the Euro yet, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania 
and Sweden fulfil perfectly the criterion of inflation rate, but on the other hand, Latvia, 
Hungary and Poland do not fulfil the price stability requirement.   
In contrast with the EU experience, the gulf union potential member countries have 
registered stability in terms of price levels, and this is mainly due to their flexible trading 
system as well as the relative strength of the US Dollar, since all the GCC countries’ 
currencies are pegged to US dollar except Kuwait.   
If the inflation rate requirement is that it should not exceed the weighted average 
inflation rate among the GCC countries by more than 2%, then only Qatar and UAE have not 
conformed to this condition, which is in fact due to the high spending by these two countries. 
Compared to the EU member countries before joining the union, the GCC member 
countries’ inflation rates were less volatile, even though Qatar and UAE do not satisfy this 
requirement, this will be an incentive for them to control their inflation rates to see them 
more stable after adopting the Khaleej Dinar. 
4.1.2. Interest rate 
 
Interest rates are, arguably, one of the most important macroeconomic variables. They 
provide a key transmission channel for the propagation of shocks throughout the economy, 
and play a fundamental role in asset pricing (Edwards, 1998). 
 In regards to the interest rate convergence, both the EU as well as the GCC countries, 
have used the same benchmark i.e. not more than 2% of the average interest rate in the 
member countries. However, the EU convergence is based on long term interest rate while 
the GCC convergence is based on the short term interest rate.  
 If the sixteen countries using the Euro now could adjust their interest rates in such a 
way that it will conform to the EU requirements, some of the new countries that have joined 
the European Union such as Poland or Hungary still did not reach the suitable level of interest 
rate above mentioned, while all the others fulfil perfectly this criterion.  
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 Due to the dependence of the GCC countries’ currencies on the US dollar, notably by 
pegging the former to the latter, the GCC countries’ interest rates have registered a high 
positive correlation with the US interest rates.  
Currently, all the GCC countries fulfil the interest rate convergence requirement, 
however the decision made lastly by the Kuwaiti government to peg its currency to a basket 
of anonymous currencies may break down this high correlation.   
The difference at this level lies in the fact that the EU convergence is based on the 
long term interest rate, which involves long term risk premiums in the area, while the GCC 
union is using the short run interest rate, which makes the EU convergence more significant 
as compared to the GMU.  
4.1.3. Foreign exchange reserve 
 
To ensure the monetary stability, the EU and the GCC have used different criterion, 
the former opted for a requirement of at least two years spent within the EU, while the latter 
has chosen the foreign exchange reserve, in such a way that each country's monetary 
authority should hold a sufficient amount of foreign reserves of no less than four months 
worth of imports. However, after the European monetary union has been achieved, the ECB 
starts managing the foreign currency reserves of the member countries as part of the price 
stability strategy decided by the union.  
It is noteworthy that for this criterion to be met by both EU member countries as well 
as GCC it is just a matter of time. For instance Romania or Bulgaria that have joined the EU 
in 2007, were already satisfying this criterion by 2009, the same applies to some extent in the 
case of the GCC countries, where some of them are still in the process of generating the four 
months worth of imports, while some others have already satisfied this criterion.  
It is worth mentioning that the decision at this level on which measure to implement is 
directly related to the exchange rate regime chosen by either union on the one hand. Since the 
GCC have opted for the US dollar peg, then they need to consolidate their pegging and face 
any attempt to speculate on the coming Khaleej Dinar. In other words, the GMU exchange 
regime is depending on the US dollar as well, meaning that an alignment of the member 
countries with the GMU exchange rate regime requirement may not be secure and wise 
enough because there are involvements of external threats as well i.e. US dollar fluctuations 
and speculation for instance.   
However, the flexibility aspect of the exchange rates adopted by the EU and the 
alignment strategy implemented make the foreign exchange reserves less relevant, because 
the member countries are given a predetermined period of time to bring their exchange rates 
to a suitable level vis-à-vis the EU requirements.   
4.1.4. Annual government deficit and debt 
 
The public deficit and debt convergence criterion which was required similarly by the 
EU as well as the GCC union is to ensure overall stability and development as well as to 
prevent debt crises, in the sense that the public deficit in most cases is covered by public debt, 
meaning that a country with continuing deficits will tend to borrow more, causing many 
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negative consequences such as the intergenerational transfer of debt, the increase of 
borrowing cost, the opportunity cost incurred by missing the chance to develop the respective 
country’s own economy.  
In the case of economic and monetary unions, EU for instance, the unsustainable debt 
position maybe fatal for the whole union, in the sense that the continuing increase in debt of a 
given country will push the other member countries to implement deflationary policies, since 
the needy country will rely on the union financial markets to solve its debt problem, causing 
the increase of interest rate in the other member countries. Furthermore, if a country which is 
issuing too much debt defaults, the other member countries will be forced to bailout by virtue 
of not been affected through a domino effect for example.  
For the European countries to join the EU and be part of the Euro users and for the 
GCC countries to join the GCC union and be part of the Khaleej Dinar users, their public debt 
and deficit should not exceed respectively 60% and 3% of the annual GDP.  
In order to reduce their net indebtedness, most of the European countries, notably 
Germany, Austria, etc. Have taken draconian and serious measures, however some other 
countries have resorted to creative accounting operations with all its negative effects on the 
transparency of public accounts. Such operations are mostly based upon sale of assets, 
exclusion from public sector consolidated accounts, subsidies recorded below the line, as 
credits or capital subscriptions and differences between accrual and cash accounts. Koen & 
Noord (2005) estimated that, thanks to such operations, over the years 1997-2003 Greece, 
Portugal and Italy were able to reduce net indebtedness respectively by 18,7, 5,3, and 4,7 of 
GDP. It is worth mentioning that currently, Italy and Greece have the highest debt to GDP 
ratio within the EU amounting to 115 and 108 respectively.  
The same reasoning above mentioned for the public debt implies in the case of public 
deficit as both components are related, where some countries have converged properly, while 
some other have relied on creative accounting to adopt the Euro, which explains actually the 
excess deficit in the case of Italy and Greece. As for the newly adhered countries, Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland do not fulfil this criterion yet, the question at this level is 
whether the convergence will be done in a total compliance with the general European and 
ethical rules or a mere creative accounting will be utilized? This will be probably answered 
by the future events.  
For the GCC countries, they have done considerable efforts which have resulted in a 
full compliance regarding the public debt and deficit criterion, however they should maintain 
this level of indebtedness and deficit notably by limiting external borrowing otherwise the 
whole union will be affected.  
Having said so, it is worth noting that GCC incomes are strongly influenced by 
exogenous volatile oil prices; hence the deficit to GDP indicator might not provide a 
satisfactory gauge. GDPs in oil producing countries fluctuate widely from year to year, which 
makes a country’s deficit closer to sustainability in favourable oil price conditions even if 
there is no change of policy stance (Chalk, 2001). 
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4.2. Convergence implications  
 
Beside the convergence criteria above mentioned and that is compulsory to fulfil in 
order to join the EU or GCC union, there are some other features that need to be fulfilled but 
with a lower degree of importance, so to speak. These features will be discussed in the next 
sections.  
4.2.1. Monetary and fiscal policies 
 
By definition, different countries will have different monetary and fiscal policies 
depending on their circumstances, monetary and fiscal preferences and so on, however, in the 
context of economic and monetary unions, the harmonisation and/or standardization is a must 
for the countries willing to join an economic and monetary union especially regarding 
monetary and fiscal policies.   
 The European Union countries were no exception of the general rule above 
mentioned, however, after the establishment of the European Central Bank, the monetary 
policy of the EU was based on a quantified definition of price stability and risk analysis as 
regards to the new monetary policy strategy adopted by the ECB as well as responsibility, 
independence, transparency and communication.  
 The price stability consists practically in price index progression along a one year 
period that should be maintained below 2% in the medium term. To achieve this stability 
level, the ECB has applied economic and monetary risk analysis by following the economic 
evolutions as well as monetary tendencies within the EU member countries.  
 The ECB which is responsible for the price stability within the EU is recognized as an 
independent entity which is not subject to any eventual pressure or influence by any possible 
parties. The independence aspect of the ECB is directly related to the ECB transparency and 
communication which will help the public at large evaluate the ECB performance and results 
as well as the decisions made by the latter.  
 Regarding the fiscal policy in the EU, it is mainly concerned with indirect taxes i.e. 
VAT, special taxes on fuel, drinks and tobacco, etc. Since these have a direct and immediate 
effect on the internal market. On the other hand, the intervention on the direct taxes is much 
more limited as compared to the indirect taxes.   
 One of the objectives of the internal market is to ensure the free circulation of goods 
and services as well as capital within the EU. Because of the independence and neutral fiscal 
policy applied in the EU, The member countries have heterogeneous fiscal policies, 
depending on their history and their national traditions. On the other hand, the decisions are 
made based on the unanimity which actually limits the possibilities of harmonisation between 
the member countries; however. The latter may deform the nature of this circulation and 
exchanges, but to prevent this risk, the member countries have decided to harmonize their 
indirect taxes, since the fiscal competition among the member countries contributes to the 
progressive convergence of the EU in terms of fiscal policies. 
 Harmonization of indirect taxes actually in this context does not mean 
standardization, since the rates are not similar in all the member countries. Every country is 
implementing a standard VAT of at least 15% and a reduced rate of at least 5% applicable to 
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some activities or products with a social or cultural aspect. The standard rates are between 
15% in Luxembourg and 25% in Sweden. As in France for instance, the standard VAT rate is 
about 19.6% and the reduced rate is 5.5%. 
 As the EU member countries are related among them, no one of them can modify the 
tax rates unilaterally, for instance, a country wishing to reduce its VAT tax rate should first 
ask for the accord of his economic partners. If for example Spain wants to reduce the VAT 
tax on restaurant services, then it should take permission from all the EU member countries. 
 For the direct taxes as mentioned earlier, the harmonization still very limited. The 
main European rules regarding the direct taxes has been put in place in order to avoid the 
double taxation on companies especially for the mother companies having subsidiaries in 
other member countries. The direct taxation is meant also for the harmonization of savings’ 
fiscal policy, since the European citizens are benefiting from the free circulation and are free 
to deposit their money in any of the member countries since the launching of the EU. But 
overall, the fiscal policy harmonization in terms of the direct taxation is applied in order to 
establish a European cooperation and fight against fiscal frauds.  
 However, in the case of GCC, it is worth mentioning that the Khaleej countries can be 
seen as less effective as compared to countries with floating exchange rates mechanisms, and 
this is not due mainly to the exchange rate per se but it may be due to the economic features 
of these countries, for instance, crude oil and natural gas constitutes the main source of 
income and foreign exchange reserves which is one of the main convergence criteria 
discussed above, furthermore, as compared to some developed countries such as US, GCC 
member countries do not possess a developed and established secondary capital market which 
constitutes a weakness of the union.   
 As it was in the case of EU, the main objective of the monetary policy of the GCC 
union is to achieve price stability within and between the member countries, even though the 
current monetary instruments are not as efficient as they normally should be. And this price 
stability of course should be controlled by the GCB.  
 When looking to the fiscal policies of the GCC countries, it is noteworthy that they 
unanimously have a high degree of expenditures, which may in some years reach 71% of the 
total spending, on the other hand, the high dependence of the GCC countries on the oil and 
gas revenues makes their economic and political as well as fiscal situation subject to the oil 
and gas price fluctuation. 
 Since the monetary and fiscal policies are highly related and given that the GCB will 
be responsible in controlling the price stability within the union, then as matter of fact, 
collaboration in terms of fiscal policies would help the GCB achieve successfully its 
objectives, otherwise, monetary and fiscal problems may emerge with the adoption of the 
Khaleej Dinar. 
 In this context, AlKholifey and Alreshan (2010) stated that there are a number of 
fiscal issues that need to be addressed by GCC countries:  
• With the efforts being made by some GCC countries to ameliorate their overall tax 
systems, issues of tax coordination might arise.  
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• To maintain harmony over various expenditure policies especially the rising current 
spending (e.g. direct and indirect subsidies) and avoid unbalanced economic growth 
among GCC economies, ex ante coordination is considered necessary.  
• To bring stability to GCC revenues and suppress GDP volatility, an issue of creating a 
multilateral oil stabilization fund could be viable.  
4.2.2. The Central Banking System (CBS) 
 
When opting for monetary and economic union, the issue is not only how to settle the 
union central bank that will replace the countries’ central banks, but also to look into the 
structure of central banking to be implemented which includes the union central bank as well 
as the national central banks. 
In the case of the EU, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) comprises the 
European Central Bank (ECB) as well as 27 National Central Banks (NCB) representing the 
27 member countries of the EU. The ECB directory members are nominated through 
unanimous agreement, by the member countries or governments’ presidents with 
recommendation of the European Union Council.   
One of the main functions of the ESCB is to elaborate the monetary policy in the Euro 
zone. Subsequently, the ECB executes the decisions made by the ESCB while the NCB are 
meant to make these decisions applicable nationally. Thus, as stated above, the main 
objective of the ESCB is to maintain price stability in the Euro zone as well as ensure a stable 
growth of the EU.  Furthermore, the ESCB holds and manages the official resources of the 
member countries that have adopted the Euro especially the foreign exchange reserves. 
The monetary policy of the ECB is based upon three main rates, from the lowest to 
the highest rate, namely, deposit rates, refinancing rate which is the most important one, and 
the last is the marginal loans rate.  
A subgroup of the ESCB has been created and named Euro System; it includes the 
central banks of the Euro zone and it has been established because most of the European 
countries that had reputation of being Euro users, actually have not adopted it yet.  
The GSCB will normally follow the model established by the EU i.e. a central 
banking system including the Gulf Central Bank (GCB) as well as the National Central Banks 
(NCB), even though there is quite a number of differences between the two cases, the main 
one being the political orientations of the GCC member countries as compared to the EU 
member countries, where the former are mainly sovereign countries, that may want to make a 
pressure for the monetary policy to be decentralized, and which may actually constitute a 
threat to the stability within the EU.  
For that matter, GCC member countries are required to settle this issue and determine 
clearly the structure of the GSCB, and the bodies it will include as well as the functions of 
each of them and all the details as regards to the nomination of the GSCB members.  
Another important issue is regarding the independence of the GSCB which we have 
highlighted earlier and which is actually common between the EU and the GMU, since for 
the central bank or the system of central banks to achieve successfully its pre-determined 
objectives, there should be a total independence from any possible influence. At this level, 
some authors consider that the political influence is the highest threat to the CBS 
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independence, meaning that a total separation between politics and the monetary policies will 
give a higher performance of the GSCBs.      
4.2.3. Pooling Foreign Exchange Reserves 
 
In addition to the foreign exchange reserve requirement above mentioned and which 
is a formal procedure prior to the GMU adhesion, the GCB requires the contribution in terms 
of foreign exchange reserves whereby every member country should contribute based on its 
weight in the union, and this is due mainly to the fact that the fixed exchange rate regimes 
forces the central banks to hold enough reserves of foreign currencies allowing them to 
intervene in the market to maintain the considerable and suitable level of exchange rates.  
 As we have mentioned earlier when we have discussed about the CBS, the European 
Union basically has followed the same reasoning and has allowed the European Central Bank 
to manage the foreign currencies reserves of the member countries in order to maintain the 
stability of the overall economy.   
4.2.4. Seigniorage revenue distribution 
 
Seigniorage is usually defined by reference to a supposed earlier stage in which full-
bodied coins were minted by the State. Each coin would contain an amount of precious metal 
equal in value as a commodity to the coin’s exchange value as well as to the value stamped 
on the coin. The State’s mint would accept gold for coining, assessing a fee, called a 
seigniorage charge. So long as that fee exceeded the mint’s costs, the State would receive net 
revenue from its minting operation i.e. seigniorage revenue (Wray, 2002). 
In the case of the European Union, the seigniorage revenue generated from the Euro 
issuance is distributed to the national central banks of the member countries that have already 
adopted the Euro based instantaneously on their GDP as well as their respective population 
proportions, which means that it is maybe subject to review in case the member countries 
agree to do so. As for the countries that have newly joined the Euro zone, it is expected that 
they will get a higher benefit as compared with their current seigniorage revenue, Hansen and 
King (2004) follow the same reasoning and state that currency demand in the new member 
countries is expected to increase relative to the present group of euro countries. This basically 
means that the demand will increase also outside the EU with its new members given the 
economic and trading partnership of the EU member countries with other non member 
countries.  
As for the GCC countries, they are expecting to base their seigniorage revenue 
distribution on the monetary base growth, which is subject to debate since member countries 
may find it easy to increase their monetary base in order to get a larger share of the 
seigniorage revenue.  
As far as the seigniorage revenue distribution for both the unions is concerned, the EU 
method has more significance and seems to be more reasonable, on the one hand because it is 
based on the real GDP and the populations proportions that cannot be falsified or manipulated 
by member countries, and on the other hand because this basis is subject to change anytime 
the member countries find it adequate to do so.   
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4.2.5. The exchange rate regime  
 
The choice of the exchange rate regime is highly important especially in the case of 
economic and unions. It considers the economic policy of the countries as well as their 
macro-economic modes of adjustment. It considers also the economic partners of these 
respective countries that are sensitive as regards to the consequences of the potential 
exchange regime on their relative competitiveness, thus, the exchange rate regimes determine 
the conditions of the international integration of the economies.  
The member countries of the EU have chosen a flexible exchange rate regime, and 
they seem to be convinced with the adequacy of their choice, Lorenzo Bini Smaghi7 stated in 
the 2007 annual Meeting that this was the obvious decision to take and he added that it would 
have made no sense at all to create the euro and then subject its monetary policy to external 
rather than internal requirements. 
 For the European countries that have joined the EU lately, although their current 
exchange rate regimes are totally different, this does not mean that they will certainly have 
misalignment problems, by reference to the Portugal, Spain or Greece previous successful 
experiences. 
Although the GCC countries did not officially opt for either exchange rate regime, the 
fact that all member countries except Kuwait have pegged their national currencies to US 
dollar, is a sign that among other regimes, the dollar peg may be the preferable to the GCC 
member countries, that have made their decision based on the assumption that the US dollar 
will keep strengthening. This potential decision is also proven by the fact that the member 
countries have put in place some measures that are compatible with the US dollar peg, such 
as their fiscal policies or the accumulation of the foreign reserves for instance.  
 This choice of the GCC member countries has taken into consideration not only the 
economic aspect of the regime but also the political dimensions that is basically why the 
GCC countries seem to be attached to this regime, where they have stated in several 
occasions that they are not willing to change their exchange rate regime unless the GCC 
union decides on another regime.   
As stated earlier, since the GMU are more likely to opt for US dollar peg, then it is 
relevant for them to understand the implications of their decision as well as implement 
properly the foreign exchange reserve requirement along with any other adequate measures 
for them to avoid shocks that may hit the US dollar especially in the current circumstances.  
Furthermore, the GCC member countries should make sure that the convergence 
procedure is done in the best manner, whereby there should be no creative accounting to skip 
the official adhesion procedure. Greece and Italy lesson for instance should be learnt in order 
to not commit the same fatal mistakes.  
In the following sections we will expose some of the suggestions that may be helpful 
for the GMU to enhance its formation in terms of exchange rate regime as well as in terms of 
risk management.  
 
 
                                                          
7
 Member of the ECB Executive Board 
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5. Suggestions for improvement of the Gulf Monetary Union 
5.1 Suggestions in terms of the exchange rate regime 
5.1.1 Currency Basket Peg 
 
A basket peg could serve as a cautious strategy towards a more flexible exchange rate 
policy. With a basket peg, the main anchor properties of an exchange rate peg could be 
retained, while at the same time gaining some adaptability to the adverse effects of swings 
among the value of the major reserve currencies. The volatility of the nominal effective 
exchange rate would be reduced, benefiting external trade and balance sheet stability. For 
example, a peg to the SDR would result in lower volatility of oil export receipts relative to 
the dollar peg. 
Implementing a basket peg may be a useful way to introduce more flexibility of the 
exchange rate in a gradual manner, which would allow private market participants to learn to 
manage and live with foreign exchange risk. Compared to fixing to a single currency, 
pegging to a basket of currencies has the disadvantage that traders will have to bear the 
exchange rate risk. And in relatively underdeveloped financial markets hedging exchange rate 
risk would be difficult and costly. On the other hand, pegging to a single major currency 
allows market participants to take advantage of instruments available for that major currency. 
What probably matters most is the extent of the higher exchange rate risk versus the reduced 
cost from lower exchange rate volatility.  
One disadvantage of basket pegs is that they may reduce the microeconomic and 
informational benefits of maintaining constant at least one bilateral exchange rate relevant for 
price comparisons and economic transactions. Also, basket pegs tend to be less transparent 
and more difficult to explain to the public. The weights attached to the basket will have to be 
managed and lack of transparency could encourage speculative behavior, as the example of 
Kuwait shows. 
 One simple approach would be to peg to a transparent basket consisting only of the 
US dollar and the euro. It would be simple to interpret, would reduce monetary dependence 
of the GCC on the US Federal Reserve, cover most transactions in goods, services, and 
financial instruments (now in the US dollar and the euro area), and allow for the use of both 
dollar and euro hedging instruments to efficiently manage financial risks given the 
considerable depth in euro financial instruments (Khan, 2009). 
5.1.2. Pegging to the export price of oil 
 
Pegging the domestic currency to the export price of the main export product (PEP) 
has sometimes been suggested for small open economies that are relatively specialized in the 
production and export of a particular mineral or agricultural commodity. The argument for 
PEP is that it simultaneously delivers automatic accommodation to terms-of-trade shocks, as 
floating exchange rates are supposed to do, while retaining the credibility-enhancing 
advantages of a nominal anchor, as dollar pegs are supposed to do (Frankel and Saiki, 2002). 
A peg to the price of oil would allow the real exchange rate to move in line with the real price 
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of the main export commodity. Essentially, it would decouple oil exporters’ monetary 
policies from those of oil importers. 
But there are several important qualifications and drawbacks attached to this type of 
exchange rate policy. First, the GCC countries taken together account for a sizeable part of 
total world output and exports. Therefore, the small economy assumption is not applicable in 
the case of the GCC, as the price of oil cannot be regarded as exogenous. Indeed oil can be 
seen as a major international currency in itself, and pegging their national (fiat) currencies to 
their own (commodity) currency would not anchor the GCC countries’ currencies to 
something truly exogenous. 
Second, it is questionable whether an automatic adjustment to terms-of-trade shocks 
would be effective under a PEP system. For example, an adverse terms-of-trade shock (a 
decline in oil prices) would, under the PEP, result in a real depreciation. However, with oil 
production in most GCC countries constrained by capacity and extraction limits, as well as by 
the OPEC quota system, all adjustments would have to come through expanding non-oil 
exports or cutting imports. However, in the GCC, non-oil exports depend on hydrocarbon 
production for inputs, and are therefore not independent from the level of oil and gas 
production. 
Third, pegging to the price of oil would make import prices highly variable, as well as 
create significant volatility for other sectors of the economy. For example, a consequence of 
high oil prices would be a real appreciation, which would raise the cost of other exports and 
dampen the diversification effort. In particular, the prices of non-pegged tradable goods 
would be destabilized in terms of domestic wages and nontraded goods, which could lead to 
adverse Dutch disease effects when oil prices rose. In the event of a decline in oil prices, it is 
unclear whether the oil peg would permit sufficient depreciation of the national currency to 
accommodate the adverse change in the terms of trade and stabilize export earnings. Further, 
it can be argued that a gradual adjustment in the real exchange rate may be preferable until 
the terms-of-trade shift appears permanent. In any event, with daily fixing of the exchange 
rate, PEP requires transparency and credibility that may take time to establish. 
5.1.3. Commodity basket peg  
 
Basically the alternatives above mentioned are more suitable and desirable as 
exchange rate regime for the expected launch of Gulf Dinar as compared to the Dollar peg 
regime. But in contrast with an oil backed currency, the latter is much more suitable for many 
considerations especially the Oil reserves that the GCC countries possess, however, a 
currency backed by only one commodity can be more exposed to speculative attacks as 
compared to currency backed by a dozen or so of commodities. That is why we strongly 
recommend the GCC member countries to issue their common currency in a commodity 
basket backed aspect.  
The implementation of GCC’s commodity basket backed currency should be backed 
by a standardized basket of the most important commodities mainly Oil and other 
commodities (e.g., gold, wheat, copper, etc). It would, therefore, be conceptually similar to a 
fully backed gold standard, but in the case of the commodity basket peg, the backing would 
consist not of one single commodity but of a number of main international commodities, 
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including gold. Since it is fully backed by a physical inventory of commodities, the 
commodity basket peg would be a secure, robust and credible payment and provide a stable 
international mechanism for contractual and payment purposes worldwide. 
This kind of currency is designed as an inflation-resistant currency by its very 
composition. Inflation is always defined as “the changes in value of a basket of goods and 
services.” By selecting the appropriate ingredients to be placed in the basket, the commodity 
basket peg can automatically protect and be protected against inflation. On the other hand, it 
provides a robust international standard of value. 
The commodity basket peg automatically tends to counteract the boom and bust 
fluctuations of the business cycle, thereby improving the overall stability and predictability of 
the world’s economic system. When the business cycle is weakening, corporations 
customarily have an excess of inventory and a need for credit. These corporations would 
immediately spend the commodity basket currencies, say, to pay their suppliers, so as to 
avoid the demurrage charges8. Suppliers, in turn, would have a similar incentive to pass on 
the demurrage-charged currency as a medium of payment. The spread of this currency (with 
its built-in incentive to trade) would automatically activate the economy at this point in the 
cycle. 
The demurrage feature of the commodity backed currency would provide a systematic 
financial motivation to realign financial interests with longer-term interests. This is in direct 
contrast with what happens today with conventional national currencies. The discounted cash 
flow of conventional national currencies with interest rates systematically emphasizes the 
immediate future at the expense of the long-term. The same discounted cash flow with a 
demurrage charged currency produces the exact opposite effect. The use of the commodity 
basket peg for planning and contractual purposes will therefore reduce the conflict that 
currently prevails between the stockholder’s financial priorities and the long-term priorities 
of humanity as a whole. 
By looking to the “real” aspect of the commodity backed currency –backed by real 
commodities- and its demurrage fees, as compared to the fiat money dominating nowadays, 
one can clearly perceive the long list of benefits that Khaleej Dinar backed by a basket of 
commodities can provide for the whole world.  
5.2. Suggestions regarding risk preventing and rescue  
5.2.1. GCC’s Crisis Fund 
 
The Geek debt crisis has bared a shortcoming of the EU's monetary union. While 
sound finances are needed to underpin the euro's stability, the rules limiting government 
deficits have not been enough to keep some countries from running up large amounts of debt. 
Nor is there an oversight procedure to ensure sound policies are implemented. In the Greek 
debt crisis, Germany and other euro nations have urged Greece not to go to the IMF for a 
bailout loan. Such a possibility is widely seen as embarrassing in euro zone capitals and 
damaging to the euro area's credibility. The crisis exposed severe defects of the euro zone, 
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including lack of economic governance in the single currency club and no collective solution 
to prevent a possible debt default in a member like Greece from threatening overall stability. 
The GCC should plan to create a Gulf Monetary Fund (GMF) to better coordinate the 
economies of the member countries that use the khaleej Dinar and prevent financial debacles 
such as the Greek debt crisis from undermining the credibility of Europe's single currency. 
The idea is that Greece’s case must not happen with GCC and they must reinforce economic 
policy coordination.   
Gulf Monetary Fund have to establish details of how much money a future GMF 
could command or what its shareholders structure would look like based on their financial 
pledges to the fund. 
However, the questions of course must be asked: who pays in, how does one pay in, 
how independent is it from the (Gulf) Commission? And so on. 
Urging the idea for some time, Gulf Monetary Fund could bail out troubled 
governments, and then use the threat of cutting off rich member support payments to force 
them to bring spending practices into line. And the GMF could set up the possibility of an 
orderly default for an indebted state in which the GMF could offer Islamic bonds to holders 
of defaulted debt, limiting the crippling ripple effects of a default. 
5.2.2. GCB’s Unit for monitoring and risk preventing  
 
GCC member countries need to co-ordinate their efforts to devise a new common 
banking policy to enable national banks to face any fresh crisis in the global financial system 
or crisis of any member. Banks in the GCC should learn lessons from the latest global 
economic turmoil and stick to known investment standards and shun derivatives and other 
high risk instruments. 
The GCC central banks should set up a unit to monitor and prevent any risk of 
default, crisis, etc. They should work on the monitoring and assessment of GCC’s members 
and guard themselves against future crises. They have to abide by known investment criteria 
and avoid harmful speculation in the local and external markets, and in investing in high-risk 
derivatives. 
The GCC central banks should have somewhat sought to co-ordinate their efforts 
before the crisis, they should have expand this co-ordination and double their efforts to 
support protection in crisis. The GCC monetary authorities are urged to devise new banking 
policies that will open a wider horizon for financial and banking co-operation in the region. 
GCC central bank should control the impact of the crises and default problems. This 
mechanism would involve stronger governance of regional banks to ensure they are better 
protected against bad debt and other crises in the future. It should have joint plan to force 
GCC banks to set aside sufficient provisions against non-performing loans to counter new 
default problems.  
In the next sections we will discuss the political Implications under fiat money system 
and real commodity peg for the Gulf Monetary Union to see the opportunities and threats in 
the context of an unstable international environment. 
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6. Political implications 
 
As it was mentioned in the previous pages that Gulf Cooperation Council has agreed 
to issue a new currency namely Gulf Dinar by the end of 2010 after a long journey that has 
started in 1983 when they signed in the first time a free-trade area. There is no double 
surrounding that Gulf Dinar will bring a lot of benefits to the GCC countries and its people in 
terms of cost reduction and cross border trades and it will eliminate risk exchange between 
local currencies. However the question is; whether it has to be flexible or pegged to Dollar, a 
basket of currencies or oil market price.  While some experts have suggested that the new 
currency should be backed by oil since gulf countries control 45% of the world's known oil 
reserves because this is high enough to gain people's confidence to accept Gulf currency as 
global currency as compared to U.S dollar. 
In this part, it is rational to focus in a more details on political implication of issuing 
Gulf Dinar as Fiat money or oil backed. So, In the absence of Soviet, the United States of 
America becomes the only super power in the world and its eye has been focusing on gulf 
region to put its hand on oil reserve of the gulf countries, therefore since the Gulf war two in 
1991 to rescue Kuwait, U.S has found a reason to stay in the Gulf region to secure itself the 
share of oil. in the current political environment issuing a new common currency in Fiat form 
for GCC union is much more applicable because the United States of America will move to 
protect the position of the Dollar as a global currency and as a medium of exchange in 
international trade transactions and it has a big influence on the GCC decision making to 
prevent the idea of Gulf Dinar backed by oil. So, in that sense, assuming that the gulf dinar 
will be pegged either to Dollar or basket of currencies including dollar as it was proposed by 
the GCC countries and then, it will give a dollar the sustainability to remain a global 
currency, moreover it will continue pricing oil in  Dollar instead of Gulf Dinar. In this case, 
there will not be much fundamental economic and political changes in the region and the rest 
of the world since it will be pegged to Dollar or basket of currencies. In other words, the 
dinar will lose its role to serve as means of payment intentionally for the reason that we are 
accepting to price oil in Dollar rather than Gulf Dinar. It is useful to note that the moment 
that they issue Gulf Dinar and link it to the price oil, it will attract the world financial 
institutions to accept it as a global new reserve currency because of the amount of oil and gas 
reserve that the GCC has.  
Hammoudeh (2007) stated that the results from the assessments of both the effects of 
the Dollar and Euro zones suggest that the GCC economies seem to be driven by terms-of-
trade and domestic shocks. In that sense, a more flexible exchange rate regime may be more 
suitable to the GCC area. The study suggests that Gulf Dinar will better adopt flexible regime 
instead of pegging to Dollar or basket of currencies, so as above mentioned, one of the 
suitable way for the GCC countries is to link the Gulf Dinar to oil price which will give the 
new currency a chance to be accepted as global reserve currency and to gain a strong position 
in the world politically and economically and that to bring justice to all citizens. 
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6.1. Commodity basket peg  
The world has been seeking peace and equal opportunities to all mankind around the 
world. Under the fiat monetary system it is impossible to realize these objectives and the 
principle of Maqasid Shariah, causing the world to fall into several wars since the early 
twenties and even before, until today. The history is a good teacher, according to Norburn 
(1975), if there is peace in the world it must start here-in the United State of America-with 
economic justice. The first and the greatest step must be the establishment of a new monetary 
system, a system in which every citizen would have an equal voice in the issue of money and 
an equal benefit from that issue.  
Great Financiers have circumvented that right and have usurped that power. They 
create the nation's money by simply writing entries in ledgers. No longer is its standard of 
value stable and used chiefly for their own private profit. Through their manipulations of 
money, property is forcibly taken from the labourers and the wealth of the world is 
concentrated into fewer hands. Achieve peace for mankind, requests not just to be just to 
citizens of your country but also requests to let every country in this world free to design its 
own monetary system that reflects its value and bring equality to its members. The main 
political implication in the case of a Gulf Dinar backed by oil, is the potential decline of US 
Dollar and subsequently the emergence of china as global super power economically and its 
necessity of energy in the world. 
 
6.2. The decline of the dollar 
The U.S economy has gone through a deed recession since the collapse of Lehman 
brothers in the last quarter of 2008 after subprime mortgage crisis that led the whole financial 
system to fall into systematic risk and then demise of major banks into bankruptcy. 
Furthermore the U.S current account has been experiencing a trade deficit since 1985, it 
means that U.S imports are far more than exports and it finances its deficit by issuing debt 
instruments dominated in U.S Dollar and its current account deficit has reached U.S $3 
trillion with rest of the world especially China and Japan.  
In addition every citizen today in the U.S is fully indebted, so no one is willing –and 
able- to have a loan even though the interest rate is low. This leads to low production and 
increasing unemployment rates, to mention but few. The failure of banks and financial 
institutions is another factor that gives a negative image. This indicates that the whole U.S.A 
-government, corporate and individuals- have been fully indebted. Duncan (2005:88) found 
out that with the dept equivalent to 60% of GDP and huge unfunded contingent liabilities for 
the social security system, the U.S government`s financial position is not good. The U.S. 
government can be relied on to spend enough to stave off economic collapse.  
During Great Depression, President Roosevelt addressed his nation, “we have nothing 
to fear, but fear itself”. Today, the only reason to fear is not fear itself. There is a high 
possibility that a derivatives market meltdown could cause a global systemic banking 
collapse that no government could afford to repair. These are a clear signs that the dollar is 
going to lose its value as well as its role for a world trade currency and medium of exchanges, 
so that when the people lose confidence in Dollar's purchasing power, the Dollar will collapse 
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and the global economy will pay the price because of the Dollar's position as world reserve 
currency. 
 
6.3. The emergence of China as the next super power 
In the recent decades, China has become one of the highest exporting countries in the 
world because of its comparative advantage of low cost of labour and its huge human capital 
resources, therefore its economy has been growing within a double digital this will give china 
its powerful role to play in the world. Das (2006: xii) has predicted that the Chinese economy 
has made the most rapid and far-reaching economic transformation in history. It is giving 
unambiguous and comprehensible indications of emerging as a key actor on the global 
economic stage in the foreseeable future.  
Accolades from academics and business professionals are well-deserved. Some of 
them even see in it a rising, if nascent, economic super-power, which is gearing up for a new 
geo-political role that is providing soft leadership to Asia in the future. There is no doubt 
about the emergence of China where the average income of Chinese citizen has risen from 
US$717 in1980 to US$4,726 in 2003 and its exports and imports increased in average annual 
rate of 10.2 percent and 9.4 percent and the most important thing is that the share of exports 
in gross domestic product augmented from 13.9 percent in 1985 to 30.1 percent in 2003.  
Edmonds et al (2008:169) stated that one of the challenges that China is facing is the 
shortage of oil supply that will affect its production that can further affect negatively its 
economic development to maintain its level of exports. Gokay (2006:141) mentioned that 
China becomes the world’s second largest importer after the USA. The China’s government 
estimates that it will need 600m metric tons of crude oil a year by 2010, more than the triple 
of its expected output because the rapid expansion growth requests increasing demand on oil 
to satisfy its need. In other words, China’s economic growth which is more based on 
manufacturing will be dependent mainly on oil. 
 
6.4. The big opportunity for GCC countries  
GCC was established in 1983. The union has a vital position to play a better economic 
and political role in the world because of its huge hydrocarbon reserve and its geographical 
position. Moreover, the similarity of culture, language and economy should be positive 
factors that can serve for a successful new currency. Taking into account all these factors, the 
Gulf Dinar has a big chance to serve as the global reserve currency. 
Overall, In the light of a collapsing Dollar, the increasing energy need of China, 
recent problem that has been faced by Euro and the huge oil reserve of Gulf countries that 
can boost a public confidence in their new issued currency so the next debate should be 
directed to the ideal decision of the gulf ruler, Whitman (2006: 28) stated that the reality is 
that national economies are hostage of oil, and that oil has become the new commodity 
measurement of value. In these conditions, the ability of a state to hold oil in reserve by either 
actually possessing it or securing access to it, reflects the history of modern finance that 
conditioned the value of a national currency on the ability of state to acquire and hoard gold 
and silver. Therefore, oil will set the value of the currency.  
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Furthermore; the Gresham law says that “bad money drives out the good one”; or that 
in a contrast with unsecured paper currency and a commodity based currency -the more 
valued commodity- will be hoarded and tends to disappear. In other words, without any doubt 
oil will become a future currency in 21th century after people have lost confidence in paper 
money. Therefore, the rational decision to be taken by GCC authorities is to decide its new 
currency to be backed by oil because of the huge oil reserve that they have and the experience 
of unsecured currencies failure so, the moment Gulf Dinar is linked to oil, it can take position 
of international currency and all central banks around the world will demand it as reserve to 
pay for trade transaction and it will serve as a good store of value and unit of account and the 
gulf countries will become one of the a key players economically and politically in the 21th 
century. 
 
7. Discussions and Conclusion 
The GCC monetary union will bring many benefits not only to the GCC member 
countries but also to non member countries, especially Muslim and developing countries, in 
the sense that many Muslim –and developing- countries today are still not only receiving 
financial aids from the United states, but highly depending on these aids9. This let these 
countries following the US rules to some extent, which means that for the time being they 
cannot enjoy a total independence, whether economically, financially, politically or even 
socially and culture-wise.  
Having said so, we submit that a GCC monetary union is a must, with a Khaleej Dinar 
backed by a basket of commodities whereby Oil should have the greatest weight among the 
commodities comprised in this basket so that Muslims will acquire back their bargaining 
power as it always was many centuries back, at the meantime, it is necessary for the GCC 
countries to strengthen their economies by developing the other sectors as well, and stop 
depending on the Oil revenue as Oil itself is not eternal.  
On the other hand, the GCC countries have the similarity advantage, in contrast with 
other regions where the economy, language, culture, nature, weather, etc...are totally 
different, the GCC countries are very much similar, and this in fact is a tool that should be 
used by these countries in order to strengthen their economic and political cooperation in the 
benefit of their benefits as well as the tiers countries once again. 
The European monetary union should be a benchmark for the GCC countries, i.e. the 
latter should consider this experience with its pros and cons, negative and positive points. For 
instance the Greece debt crisis should be analysed, understood and subsequently the 
necessary measures should be put in place in order to prevent this from happening, even 
though some authors argue that the pre-announced bailout plan maybe fatal for a monetary 
union, in the sense that it will encourage the member countries to venture into high risk 
investments and subsequently become more exposed to default, we still believe that a well 
established and regulated pre-designed bailout plan will have more pros than cons. One way 
to do it will be to determine a maximum level of investment risk the member countries can 
venture in, as well as to fix a maximum amount to be given out to help the defaulting member 
countries.  
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Furthermore, the funds used to bailout should be contributed annually as percentage 
of GDP and invested by a special body under the Gulf Central Bank, notably in investments 
with relatively low level of risk. The profit from these investments will be distributed based 
on the member countries contribution to the fund, and a determined portion of the profits will 
be kept by the GCB to rescue any of the member countries in case of financial problems.  
Another fact that the GCC countries should consider is the creative accounting 
practices that let some countries join monetary unions without effectively fulfilling the 
convergence criteria decided by the union, which was the case actually for some of the 
European union member countries prior to the adhesion10 and which is basically one of the 
roots of the problems occurring currently in the European Union. The GCC member countries 
should make sure that the convergence criteria should be satisfactorily fulfilled without 
recourse to unethical practices that are actually a threat for the whole GCC union in the sense 
that it may cause its collapse. 
With the current international circumstances, the world political and economic picture 
is most likely to change. For many years we have been looking at the United States of 
America as the world superpower not only politically but economically and financially as 
well with its currency which is so far highly demanded by the entire world. As we have 
analysed earlier, China is the expected emerging superpower notably to replace the United 
States of America. However, as the world become more and more depending on Oil and the 
global race to acquire the most possible of Oil reserves is becoming more and more ferocious, 
we submit that the GCC member countries have a very important role to play and a very high 
opportunity to be one of the political and economic leaders in the international level 
especially if their monetary union is done the way we have conceived it i.e. with a Khaleej 
Dinar backed by a basket of commodity with notably the highest weight given to Oil.  
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